

REVIEW OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

1. E.O. 12065 authorizes protection of foreign government information for up to thirty years before requiring it be reviewed for declassification under guidelines developed, where appropriate, in consultation with the foreign government concerned. The Agency position is that classified documents created by a foreign government or foreign government information, however obtained, which is used in OSS reports, may not be declassified without specific instructions from the foreign government concerned. The basis for this position is that such information and documents were given to the U.S. Government with the understanding that they would be held in confidence and, that the unauthorized or inappropriate exposure today could impact adversely on current or future U.S. liaison and diplomatic relations as well as directly on U.S. intelligence equities. These general considerations should be kept in mind when reviewing OSS records, and any given foreign government document or information should be viewed under this light. The basic requirement is to protect current and future CIA and U.S. intelligence interests. Complete guidelines which would neatly cover each and every case presented to the reviewer is not feasible. The following however, are provided to give the reviewer a more specific idea of what requires protection in the areas of sources and methods, liaison relationships, and U.S. foreign relations:

a. Sources and methods - protect the identity of agents and collaborators; informants where a serious and sustained relationship existed; include persons used jointly. Protect intelligence methods, ("theirs," "ours," or "joint") which have had continued applicability in their or our operations or would, if revealed, create a negative reaction from one of our friendly liaison services with whom we continue to cooperate, or could impact adversely on our foreign relations today or in the future. Sensitive intelligence methods are those which are not essentially identical to methods universally employed by intelligence services and therefore widely known, or that have not been rendered obsolete by technological advances.

b. Liaison relationships - consider what the liaison services' attitude and requirements are for release of their own information and records as the basis against which to consider our handling of their documents and information. All services protect their sources and we must do likewise. More difficult to judge is information concerning intelligence methods and organizational data, release of which might cause an adverse reaction that could impact negatively on our current or future relationship with that service. Identification of their personnel is certainly one such category of information that should not be generally released, organizational details another, and information that could reveal something of their methods of operation should receive careful attention.


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c. For foreign relations - An even more difficult area in which to render judgments is that information which could impact adversely on current or future U.S. foreign relations. The same categories of information noted above are applicable but here we must consider the additional factor that exposure could impact adversely on current or future U.S. foreign relations. Such problems would likely revolve around prominent personalities, controversial government policies or actions, or government to government relationships considered particularly sensitive and often maintained under some measure of secrecy for that reason. These problems are more likely to arise concerning those countries which were neutral or not totally committed to either side during WW II and who continue to follow somewhat independent roads today. Such countries would be the neutrals such as Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, Spain and Turkey. While no guide can hope to anticipate all the possibilities let alone cover them, it can at least or maybe at best sensitize reviewers to the areas where improper release of information or records could create or contribute to an adverse foreign reaction that would be detrimental to U.S. foreign policies and relations and thus to our national security. The above comments are intended as a general guide, not as a definitive or all inclusive directive. Individual judgment must be relied upon in most cases. When in doubt refer the question to C/CRG/OPS.

2. When you find foreign government information or documents which fall within the above categories they should be treated as any other document and processed as follows:

- a. Remove from box and replace with a Withdrawal Notice.
- b. Stamp the document with the reviewer's stamp.
- c. Fill in the Withdrawal Notice number and the document number from Job No. 79-00332A.
- d. Mark to indicate any change in classification.
- e. Fill in the year of the "Next Review Date" to indicate a time period of 40 years from the date of the document's creation date (30 years allowed by E.O. 12065 plus 10 years for the first review extension).
- f. Fill in the date of the review action and your employee number.
- g. Complete Form 4023A as usual.

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